來源|國際投行研究報告
【編者按：渾水發布了第四份做空安踏的報告，似乎沒有一家做空機構連續發布一家公司的做空報告的，也沒有一家公司像安踏一樣勇敢面對的，因為很多企業確實有問題。就如渾水這次說的，在他做空的14家中國公司中，超過90%的公司最後都沒好下場！那麽，安踏呢？翻譯不完全正確，所有文字內容以英文為正確】
We resume our campaign to expose ANTA’s fraud, and have several more pieces planned that will expose other inconsistencies and lies. In this piece though, we first take stock of the lies in ANTA’s responses to our pieces last week. Muddy Waters has been exposing frauds for nine years, and never once have we been accused by a regulator of lying. Yet, in almost every single instance of our accusing a company of fraud, the company denied our conclusions. Regardless, of the 14 PRC-based companies we have previously shorted due to research conclusions of fraud published on our website, six have been de-listed, one has been halted for almost five years, two have been later acquired by managements at premiums (one subsequently paid a significant regulatory settlement), two are down over 90%, two more are down significantly, and only one other stock is up. That’s 11-3 by our reckoning. Nine of these wins are knockouts (down over 90%, de-listed, or in suspended animation).
我們重新啟動我們的行動，以揭露安踏的欺詐行為，我們計劃揭露其他不一致和謊言的內容。不過，在這篇文章中，我們首先評估了安踏上周對我們作品的回應中的謊言。Muddy Waters對欺詐行為的揭露已經持續了九年，從來沒有一次我們被一個監管者指責說謊。然而，在我們指責欺詐公司的幾乎每一個案例中，公司都會否認我們的結論。無論如何，由於我們網站上發布的欺詐研究結論，我們之前已經做空了14家中國公司，其中6家已被除名，其中一家已停業近五年，其中兩家後來被管理層以保費收購（ 一個人隨後支付了一項重要的監管和解協議，其中兩個下跌超過90％，另外兩個下跌顯著，只有一個其他股票上漲。也就是11-3。其中9次獲勝是淘汰賽（超過90％，被除名，或者是假死）。
So with ANTA we see the same pattern: We present evidence of fraud (in this case, well over 100 pages and counting), the company denies it, and surrogates come out to defend the company. In this case, the company has shifted almost all of the burden of defense to the ever-pliable sell-side, effectively turning some analysts into little more than sock puppets. Ordinarily, managements have no effective downside to trying to lie their way out of fraud accusations – there is usually no increased regulatory penalty or shareholder opprobrium, so lying in the fact of fraud accusations becomes one of the most asymmetric bets a management can undertake. In ANTA’s case, it has outsourced much of the lying to the sock puppets, effectively mutualizing the reputational risk. We now address these lies-in-response.
因此，在安踏，我們看到相同的模式：我們提供欺詐證據（在這種情況下，超過100頁），公司否認它，並且代理人出來為公司辯護。在這種情況下，該公司已將幾乎所有的防禦負擔轉移到不斷變化的賣方，從而有效地將一些分析師變成了小襪子。通常情況下，管理層沒有有效的下行方式試圖擺脫欺詐指控 - 通常沒有增加監管處罰或股東的譴責，因此欺詐指控這一事實成為管理層可以采取的最不對稱的賭注之一。在安踏的案例中，它已將大部分謊言外包給襪子木偶，有效地使聲譽風險相互影響。我們現在解決這些謊言反應。
Lie 1: “We never said we own all Fila stores” ANTA’s statement through analysts that it never claimed to own all Fila stores is an attempt to rewrite history, and it is a lie. This fact points again to our conclusion that the reported numbers for Fila cannot be relied upon. Our Part 3 report made it literally indisputable that a third party, Mr. Su Weiqing, owned the Beijing Fila stores. The company initially reacted by issuing a Clarification Announcement that stated it “vigorously denies” the allegations. The problem ANTA had with this de年l is that even a 10-year old could see it was a lie. So ANTA attempted to re-write history by falsely stating through sock puppets that it never claimed to own all Fila stores.1Just weeks prior to publishing our report, we held a call with ANTA’s internal Investor Relations representative, Ms. Suki Wong. We asked her whether ANTA owns all Fila stores in China, and she repeatedly assured us that it does. Below is the transcript of the portions of the conversation that dealt with Fila store ownership. Q: [With respect to Fila] In 2014 you went from wholesale to retail, and then when you say you went from wholesale to retail, everything is self-owned and self-operated?
謊言1：“我們從未說過我們擁有所有Fila商店”
安踏通過分析師聲明，它從未聲稱擁有所有Fila商店是試圖重寫歷史，這是一個謊言。這一事實再次指出了我們的結論，即Fila報告的數字不能依賴。我們的第3部分報告使第三方蘇偉青先生擁有北京Fila商店毫無疑問。該公司最初通過發布澄清公告作出反應，聲明其“強烈否認”這些指控。安踏對此否認的問題是，即使是10歲的人也會認為這是謊言。因此，安踏試圖通過虛假陳述其從未聲稱擁有所有Fila商店的襪子來重寫歷史。在發布我們的報告前幾周，我們與安踏的內部投資者關係代表Suki Wong女士進行了一次電話會議。我們問她安踏是否擁有中國的所有Fila商店，她一再向我們保證確實如此。以下是涉及Fila商店所有權的對話部分的記錄。
問：[關於Fila] 2014年你從批發到零售，然後當你說你從批發到零售時，一切都是自有和自營？
上述內容當然與安踏在回應Blue Orca Capital / Soren Aandahl的演講時所說的一致。在回應電話會議上，據報導，首席財務官賴世賢被問及安踏是否正在考慮為Fila批發，並回應說：“我們沒有計劃讓Fila進行批發......我們將繼續經營Fila的自營模式 ”
這似乎是一個非常合適的時機來披露安踏確實從事Fila品牌下的一些批發業務。迄今為止最合乎邏輯的結論是，安踏打算向投資者說謊其對Fila商店的所有權。不應依賴Fila財務。
Lie 2: The disposal of Shanghai Fengxian and its subsidiaries was proper.
Through a sock puppet, ANTA management addressed the obviously corrupt and improper transaction by stating that the international brands retail business was doing poorly, as evidenced by its losses, and that the recipient was an independent party. This was a new, rapidly growing business that was ahead of plan in terms of sales.4 One would think that even the least switched-on sock puppet would understand that new, rapidly growing businesses often report losses. This is not a valid reason for the disposal. Instead, it shows that ANTA insiders stuffed the public company shareholders with losses necessary to scale the business before taking it for themselves.
謊言2：上海奉賢及其子公司的處置是恰當的
通過一個襪子傀儡，安踏管理層通過聲明國際品牌零售業務表現不佳，其損失證明，並且收款人是一個獨立的第三方，解決了明顯腐敗和不正當的交易。這是一個新的，快速增長的業務，在銷售方面領先於計劃.人們會認為，即使是最不開啟的襪子傀儡也會理解新的，快速增長的企業經常報告虧損。這不是處置的正當理由。相反，它表明安踏內部人員向公眾公司股東填補了在為自己取得業務之前擴大業務所需的損失。
The ultimate recipient of Shanghai Fengxian was not an independent party – certainly not in substance, and likely not in form. After Fengxian passed through a straw buyer within six months, the ultimate recipient was ANTA proxy network member Chen Dinglong. At the time, Chen was the largest shareholder of a then-disclosed Connected Person, Guangzhou Anda. Even if ANTA were to argue that Chen was technically not a Connected Person, the use of the obvious straw purchaser to disguise the ultimate recipient shows that Chen is, in fact, a Connected Person.
上海奉賢的最終收款人不是一個獨立的第三方 - 當然不是實質上的，也可能不是形式上的。奉賢在六個月內通過一名稻草買家後，最終收件人是安踏代理網絡成員陳定龍。當時，陳是當時披露的關聯人士廣州安達的第一大股東。即使安踏認為陳在技術上不是關聯人，使用明顯的吸管購買者來掩蓋最終的接收者，這表明陳實際上是一個關聯人。
Lie 3: ANTA distributors are independent, and are not Connected Persons.
The evidence is overwhelming that ANTA brand distributors are not actually independent, and that they are controlled by ANTA in ways that make them Connected Persons. More importantly, as we detailed in Part 1, ANTA controls their finance departments by hiring the finance manager and paying finance department employees (likely through Yundong). This control over finance departments in particular is improper and we believe enables ANTA to create fraudulent transactions. Having this control is not about supporting distributors in their marketing, nor providing management knowhow. The obvious purpose is to create accounting records. (Note also the use of ANTA IT infrastructure by distributors’ finance personnel reporting to SAIC.5)
謊言3：安踏分銷商是獨立的，並非聯繫人
有證據表明，安踏品牌經銷商實際上並不是獨立的，並且他們受到安踏的控制，使其成為聯網人。更重要的是，正如我們在第1部分中詳述的那樣，安踏通過聘請財務經理和支付財務部門員工（可能通過雲東）來控制其財務部門。特別是對財務部門的控制是不恰當的，我們認為安踏可以創建欺詐性交易。擁有這種控制權不是為了支持分銷商的行銷，也不是提供管理知識。顯而易見的目的是創建會計記錄。（另請注意分銷商的財務人員向SAIC報告使用ANTA IT基礎設施。）
The below is from ANTA’s 2018 Annual Report.6 It lists the auditors’ methods for reviewing recognition of revenue from distributors: a) reviewing distributor agreements (supplied by ANTA), b) assessing whether ANTA’s accounts reflect revenue in the manners the distributor agreements provide (information supplied by ANTA), c) reviewing documentation of credit notes and returns (supplied by ANTA), d) sending confirmation letters to the distributors (whose finance departments ANTA controls), and e) asking management (the masterminds of the fraud) about significant sales adjustments.
以下是安踏2018年度報告.6它列出了審計員審查經銷商收入確認的方法：a）審查經銷商協議（由安踏提供），b）評估安踏的账戶是否以經銷商協議提供的方式反映收入 （安踏提供的信息），c）審查信用票據和退貨的文件（由安踏提供），d）向分銷商（其財務部門安踏控制）發送確認函，以及e）詢問管理層（欺詐的主謀） 關於重大的銷售調整。
Conclusion ANTA has shown no evidence to counter the well over 100 pages of evidence and commentary regarding ANTA’s corruption. Rather, it has relied on proxies to make unsupported (and nonsensical) statements. Why? Because liars lie.
結論
安踏沒有證據可以反駁超過100頁的證據以及有關安踏腐敗的評論。
相反，它依賴於代理來不受支持的（和無意義的）語句。
為什麽？因為騙子說謊。
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