橡樹資本霍華德：美聯儲降息另一面，加息

編者語：

許多人關注經濟的運作以及中央銀行對其進行影響並看到合乎邏輯和直截了當的事情的努力。其他人則看到一個複雜的生態系統，其中包含財務，政治和行為組成部分，這些趨勢是可以理解的，但肯定會受到重大不確定性和模糊性的影響。霍華德則自稱是是後者之一。他認為美聯儲及其考慮因素是複雜的，多方面的，其特點是大量的一手掌握而另一方面。本文對此做詳細解釋。敬請閱讀。

文/霍華德（橡樹資本創始人）

It often happensthat just as I’m about to release a memo, I come across something thatabsolutely has to be incorporated. That was the case on June 12, the day “This Time It’sDifferent” waspublished. I was reading a first-quarter report from Ruffer, aLondon-based money manager, and I came across the following question:

經常會發生這樣的情況，正如我即將發布備忘錄一樣，我遇到了絕對必須要合並的內容。6月12日就是這種情況，即“這次與眾不同”這一天出版了。我正在閱讀倫敦資金經理Ruffer的第一季度報告，我遇到了以下問題：

Can the Fed, withits discretions and its firepower, keep a market dislocation at bay, or halt itonce it has begun?

美聯儲能否憑借其自由裁量權和火力保持市場混亂，或者一旦開始就停止它？

That question causedme to think back to remarks made a few days earlier by Federal Reserve ChairmanJerome Powell regarding how the Fed would deal with the possibility of a tradewar and its potential ramifications:

這個問題讓我回想幾天前美聯儲主席傑羅姆鮑威爾關於美聯儲如何處理貿易戰的可能性及其潛在影響的言論：

We are closely monitoringthe implications of these developments for the U.S. economic outlook and, asalways, we will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion, with a stronglabor market and inflation near our symmetric 2% objective. (CNBC, June 4)

正密切關注這些發展對美國經濟前景的影響，並且一如既往，我們將采取適當行動來維持擴張，強大的勞動力市場和通脹接近我們對稱的2％目標。（CNBC，6月4日）

Together, these two inputs prompted me toreflect on the role and powers of the Fed. In short, is it the Fed’s job to sustain expansions and keep marketdislocations at bay ad infinitum? I concludedthat “This Time It’s Different” shouldn’t ignore this subject and, as a result,reworked the end of its section on quantitative easing, adding a new finalparagraph:

總之，這兩項投入促使我思考美聯儲的作用和權力。簡而言之，美聯儲的工作是維持擴張並使市場混亂無處不在嗎？我的結論是“這個時間不同”不應該忽視這個主題，因此，重新編寫了關於量化寬鬆的部分的結尾，增加了一個新的最後一段：

Can government actions permanently raisethe level of demand in an economy, or do they mostly accelerate future demandinto the present? If the latter, can QEelevate GDP forever above what it otherwise would have been? I doubt it. But if it could, wouldn’t that eventually cause what I call an “excess,”leading to a recession?

政府行為能否永久性地提高經濟體的需求水準，還是主要是將未來需求加速到現在？如果是後者，QE能否將GDP永遠提升到原來的水準？我對此表示懷疑。但如果可能的話，最終是否會導致我所說的“過剩”，導致經濟衰退？

Finally, when I hear people talk about thepossibility that the Fed will prevent a recession, I wonder whether it’s evendesirable for it to have that goal. Perthe above, are recessions really avoidable or merely postponable? And if the latter, is it better for them tooccur naturally or be postponed unnaturally? Might efforts to postpone them create undue faith in the power andintentions of the Fed, and thus a return of moral hazard? And if the Fed wards off a series of littlerecessions, mightn’t that just mean that, when the ability to keep doing soreaches its limit, the one that finally arrives will be a doozy?

最後，當我聽到人們談論美聯儲將阻止經濟衰退的可能性時，我想知道它是否有可能實現這一目標。根據上述情況，經濟衰退是真的可以避免還是僅僅是推遲？如果是後者，它們更好地自然發生還是不自然地推遲？推遲這些努力的努力是否會對美聯儲的權力和意圖造成過度的信任，從而導致道德風險的回歸？如果美聯儲避免了一系列小小的經濟衰退，那麽這可能不僅僅意味著，當這種能力繼續達到極限時，那最終到來的那個將是一個蠢貨嗎？

I’m so glad these last-minute inspirationscaused me to include the above. I thinkthe topic is very important, so much so that I’m now going to devote a memo tothe subject of Fed interest-rate management.

我很高興這些最後一刻的靈感讓我把上面的內容包括在內。我認為這個話題非常重要，以至於我現在要在美聯儲利率管理方面投入備忘錄。

What Do Fed Actions Tell Us?

美聯儲行動告訴我們什麽？

Many people look at the operation of aneconomy and the efforts of a central bank to influence it and see things thatare logical and straightforward. Otherssee a complex ecosystem that has financial, political and behavioralcomponents, with tendencies that are understandable but certainly subject tosignificant uncertainty and ambiguity. I’m one of the latter. I think ofthe Fed and its considerations as complex, multi-faceted and characterized by agreat deal of on-the-one-hand-but-on-the-other-hand. I’ll explain at length below, right afterissuing my usual caveats: I’m not an economist, an expert on monetary policy ora Fed watcher – just a casual observer.

許多人關注經濟的運作以及中央銀行對其進行影響並看到合乎邏輯和直截了當的事情的努力。其他人則看到一個複雜的生態系統，其中包含財務，政治和行為組成部分，這些趨勢是可以理解的，但肯定會受到重大不確定性和模糊性的影響。我是後者之一。我認為美聯儲及其考慮因素是複雜的，多方面的，其特點是大量的一手掌握而另一方面。在發出我慣常的警告之後，我將在下面詳細解釋：我不是經濟學家，貨幣政策專家或美聯儲觀察員-只是一個不經意的觀察者。

Many people take Fed actions at facevalue. When the Fed cuts interest rates,as the consensus expects it to do soon, investors take that as a“buy”signal. Their thoughtprocess is simple: weak economyrate cutseconomic stimulusstronger GDPhigher corporate profitshigher stock prices. Forthis reason, many people–first-level thinkers that they are–take a statement like Powell’s above as simplistic and a positive.

許多人以面值看待美聯儲的行動。當美聯儲降息時，正如市場普遍預期的那樣，投資者將其視為“買入”信號。他們的思維過程很簡單：經濟疲軟降息經濟刺激GDP增長企業利潤提高股價上漲。出於這個原因，許多人-他們的第一級思想家-采取像鮑威爾一樣的聲明，簡單而積極。

But there’s much more to the story. Digging deeper, one should ask, “Why is theFed cutting rates?” The answer, ofcourse, is that the Fed anticipates economic weakness (or sees it taking place)and wants to ward it off. So thesecond-level thinker wonders how bad the outlook is, how much worse it mighthave gotten without the rate cut, and whether the cut will be sufficient toavert a slowdown.

但這個故事還有很多。深入挖掘，人們應該問，“為什麽美聯儲降息？”當然，答案是美聯儲預計經濟疲軟（或看到它正在發生），並希望阻止它。因此，二級思想家想知道前景是多麽糟糕，沒有降息可能會有多糟糕，以及削減是否足以避免經濟放緩。

In 2006, on the way to the Global FinancialCrisis, delinquencies on sub-prime mortgages began to rise. The trend became more noticeable in mid-2007,leading to falling prices for mortgage-backed securities; margin calls formortgage-backed-securities funds (from banks that had given them leverage);and, eventually, fund meltdowns. Mostprominently, on July 31, 2007, two mortgage-backed-securities funds managed byBear Stearns filed for bankruptcy.

2006年，在走向全球金融危機的道路上，次級抵押貸款的違約率開始上升。這種趨勢在2007年中期變得更加明顯，導致抵押貸款支持證券價格下跌;保證金要求抵押貸款支持證券基金（來自給予杠杆的銀行）;並且，最終，資金崩潰。最突出的是，2007年7月31日，由貝爾斯登管理的兩家抵押貸款支持證券基金申請破產。

Investors wanted help, and the Fed rode tothe rescue. On September 18, it cut thefed funds rate by 50 basis points, from 5.25% to 4.75%, and issued a statementthat included the following:

投資者需要幫助，而美聯儲也在尋求幫助。9月18日，它將聯邦基金利率從5.25％下調50個基點至4.75％，並發表聲明，其中包括：

Today’s action is intended to helpforestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that mightotherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and to promotemoderate growth over time. . . .

今天的行動旨在幫助預防一些可能因金融市場中斷而產生的對更廣泛經濟的不利影響，並促進長期適度增長。。。。

Developments in financial markets since theCommittee’s last regular meeting have increased the uncertainty surrounding theeconomic outlook. The Committee willcontinue to assess the effects of these and other developments on economicprospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainableeconomic growth.

自委員會上次例會以來金融市場的發展增加了經濟前景的不確定性。委員會將繼續評估這些和其他發展對經濟前景的影響，並將根據需要采取行動，促進價格穩定和可持續經濟增長。

The rate cut and message were warmlyreceived, with the S&P 500 rising more than 6% over the next twoweeks. Few people, I think, questionedwhether this really was good news.

降息和消息受到熱烈歡迎，標準普爾500指數在未來兩周內上漲超過6％。我認為很少有人質疑這是否真的是好消息。

Shortly after that first cut, I consideredthe following question: If you went to the doctor for an ailment and he pulledout a huge hypodermic needle, would you take that as good news or bad? Since the vast majority of Fed actionsconsist of 25-basis-point interest rate cuts or increases, doesn’t a cut of 50basis points mean the Fed finds the outlook particularly worrisome? If a rate cut of 25 basis points is good newsfor the markets, is a cut of 50 basis points better or worse?

在第一次切割之後不久，我考慮了以下問題：如果你去找醫生治療疾病，並且他拔出了一個巨大的皮下注射針頭，你會把它視為好消息還是壞消息？由於絕大多數美聯儲的行動都包括25個基點的降息或增加，不會減少50個基點意味著美聯儲認為前景特別令人擔憂嗎？如果降息25個基點對市場來說是好消息，那麽降息50個基點是好還是差？

My point is that a rate cut’s implicationsaren’t always as simple a matter as they may appear to be. Assuming the Fed is a good diagnostician, adecision to cut rates isn’t necessarily good news. You can argue that, if there’s trouble ahead,we’re better off with a rate cut than without one. But that still doesn’t make it goodnews. First, it means the Fed thinkstrouble is looming. And second, itcertainly doesn’t guarantee the problem will be solved. (It’s worth noting that 18 months after thatfirst rate cut in September 2007 – during which time ten more cuts followed,eventually taking the fed funds rate to nearly zero – the S&P 500 finallybottomed out, down more than 50% from where it stood on the day of the firstcut.)

我的觀點是降息的影響並不總是像它們看起來那麽簡單。假設美聯儲是一名優秀的診斷醫生，降低利率的決定並不一定是好消息。你可以說，如果前方遇到麻煩，我們的降息會比沒有降息更好。但這仍然不會成為好消息。首先，這意味著美聯儲認為麻煩正在逼近。其次，它肯定不能保證問題得到解決。（值得注意的是，在2007年9月首次降息後的18個月-在此期間又進行了十次降息，最終將聯邦基金利率降至接近零-標準普爾500指數最終觸底反彈，從現有水準下跌超過50％在第一次切割當天。）

Are Low Interest Rates a Good Thing?

低利率是一件好事嗎？

The Fed’s decision early this year todepart from its announced program of rate increases is widely recognized as amain contributor – if not the main contributor – to investors’ decision to stoppushing down the markets through selling, as well as to the rally indicated bythe S&P 500’s gain of roughly 20% so far this year. Since then the rally has been propelled bythe expectation of rate cuts, and by statements like Powell’s on page one.

今年早些時候美聯儲決定脫離其宣布的加息計劃，被廣泛認為是投資者決定通過拋售推遲市場推動的主要貢獻者-如果不是主要貢獻者-以及標準普爾500指數今年迄今為止漲幅約為20％。從那以後，這種反彈一直受到降息預期的推動，以及第一頁的鮑威爾的言論。

This is the case because of the widespreadgeneral faith in the progression I laid out above: weak economyrate cutseconomic stimulusstronger GDPhigher corporate profitshigher stock prices. Buthow, exactly, do low rates contribute to wealth creation?

情況就是如此，因為我對上述進展的普遍信心：經濟疲軟降息經濟刺激GDP增長企業利潤增加股價上漲。但是，低利率究竟如何有助於創造財富？

Low interest rates encourage spending onthe part of consumers. Low rates reducethe cost of borrowing, lifting demand for things that are often bought on timeor leased, like cars, homes and appliances. Further, low rates translate into lower monthly payments onfloating-rate mortgages, leaving consumers more disposable income tospend. Finally, with rates low, spendinginstead of saving entails little in the way of opportunity costs.

低利率鼓勵消費者支出。低利率降低了借貸成本，提高了對經常按時購買或租賃的物品的需求，如汽車，家庭和電器。此外，低利率轉化為浮動利率抵押貸款的每月支付較低，使消費者可支配的可支配收入增加。最後，在利率較低的情況下，支出而不是儲蓄幾乎不會帶來機會成本。

Low rates likewise encourage investment onthe part of businesses by reducing the cost of capital, and therefore thereturn hurdle for expenditures.

低利率同樣通過降低資本成本以及支出的回報障礙來鼓勵企業投資。

對商品和服務的需求增加導致招聘增加，失業率下降和勞動力市場趨緊，從而導致通貨膨脹。工資上漲通過向工資收入者的口袋投入更多資金並改善他們的情緒來鼓勵消費者支出。

Increased demand for goods and servicesleads to increased hiring, reduced unemployment and a tighter labor market, andthus to wage inflation. Rising wagesencourage consumer spending by putting more money into wage-earners’ pocketsand improving their mood.

By reducing the interest expense oncompanies’ floating-rate debt, low rates enhance companies’ profits; make iteasier for them to service their debt; and leave them more cash for capitalexpenditures (which add to GDP), and dividends and stock buy-backs (which putmoney in investors’ pockets).

通過降低公司浮動利率債務的利息支出，低利率可以提高公司的利潤;使他們更容易償還債務;並為他們留下更多現金用於資本支出（增加GDP），以及股息和股票回購（將資金投入投資者的口袋）。

Low rates reduce the discount factor usedin calculating the net present value of future cash flows. Thus, all else being equal, there’s a directconnection between declining interest rates and rising asset prices. (I consider this to have been the dominantfeature of the world of finance over the last ten years.)

低利率降低了用於計算未來現金流量淨現值的折現因子。因此，在其他條件相同的情況下，利率下降與資產價格上漲之間存在直接聯繫。（我認為這是過去十年來金融界的主要特徵。）

Low rates on savings and fixed-incomeinvestments drive investors to accept increased risk in order to pursue decentreturns in a low-return world. Thisincreased risk tolerance makes the financial markets more accommodating,increasing the availability of financing for ventures that otherwise might findcapital in short supply.

低儲蓄和固定收益投資率使投資者接受增加的風險，以便在低回報的世界中獲得可觀的回報。這種增加的風險承受能力使金融市場更加寬鬆，增加了企業融資的可用性，否則可能會發現資金短缺。

Finally, rate cuts are taken as a predictorof further rate cuts, implying more of all the above. When they’re moving in a positive direction,the things described above contribute to the appearance of a virtuous circle.

最後，降息被視為進一步降息的預測因素，這意味著更多上述因素。當他們朝著積極的方向前進時，上述事物有助於形成良性循環。

For these reasons, most market participants(a) would rather have low rates than high rates and (b) seem to believe thatthe lower rates are, the better. At thispoint in time, the U.S. is led by a great cheerleader for low rates. In fact, Powell’s 2018 decision to continuehis predecessor’s rate increases and quantitative tightening earned him a placeon the list of people experiencing President Trump’s wrath. Here are a few indications of the esteem inwhich Trump holds Powell:

由於這些原因，大多數市場參與者（a）寧願低利率而不是高利率;（b）似乎認為利率越低越好。在這個時候，美國由一個偉大的拉拉隊長率領低價。事實上，鮑威爾2018年決定繼續其前任的加息和數量緊縮使他在經歷川普總統憤怒的人名單上佔有一席之地。以下是川普持有鮑威爾的一些跡象：

My biggest threat is the Fed. Because the Fed is raising rates too fast,and it’s independent, so I don’t speak to him, but I’m not happy with what he’sdoing. (Trump, speaking to Fox BusinessNetwork, October 16, 2018)

我最大的威脅是美聯儲。因為美聯儲加息太快，而且是獨立的，所以我不跟他說話，但我對他正在做的事情不滿意。（川普，與福克斯商業網絡，2018年10月16日）

“Here’s a guy, nobody ever heard of before, and now I made him and hewants to show how tough he is? O.K. Let him show how tough he is,” Mr. Trump saidon Wednesday. “He’s not doing a goodjob.”

“這是一個人，以前沒有人聽說過，現在我做了他，他想表明他有多麽強硬？好。讓他表明他是多麽強硬，“川普周三說。“他做得不好。”

. . . “We should have [European CentralBank head] Draghi, instead of our Fed person,” Mr. Trump said. “Draghi, last week, he said lower interestrates and we’re going to stimulate the economy. They’re going to put money into the economy.”

。。。川普說：“我們應該讓[歐洲央行行長]德拉吉，而不是我們的美聯儲人士。”“德拉吉，上周，他說利率降低，我們將刺激經濟。他們將把錢投入經濟。“

. . . Those comments came after Mr. Trump on Monday accused the Fed ofbotching the job. “Now they stick, likea stubborn child, when we need rate cuts and easing, to make up for what othercountries are doing against us. Blewit!” Mr. Trump said on Twitter. (The NewYork Times, June 26)

。。。川普周一指責美聯儲捏造這項工作後發表了這些言論。“現在，當我們需要降息和放鬆時，他們像頑固的孩子一樣堅持，以彌補其他國家對我們所做的事情。吹噓它！“川普先生在推特上說。（紐約時報，6月26日）

Why would Trump want lower rates? Here are a few possible explanations:

川普為什麽要降低利率？以下是一些可能的解釋：

He’s a real estate guy, and the real estateindustry lives on high leverage.

Trump has been a substantial borrower formuch of his life, so for him low rates are “all good.”

Right now Trump is tightly focused ongetting reelected, and ensuring economic growth and a rising stock market overthe next 16 months is one of the best things he can do to make that a reality.

Along those lines, if reelection is hismain goal, he may be relatively indifferent as to what happens after ElectionDay 2020, when the scorecard he cares about most will be closed out.

他是一個房地產人，而房地產行業則依靠高杠杆率。

川普在他的大部分時間裡都是一個重要的借款人，所以對他而言，低利率“一切都很好”。

現在川普一直專注於重新連任，確保經濟增長和未來16個月股市上漲是他能做到的最好的事情之一。

按照這些方針，如果重新選舉是他的主要目標，他可能會對2020年選舉日之後發生的事情相對漠不關心，因為他最關心的記分卡將被關閉。

Here’s an expression of Trump’s position onrates:

以下是川普對利率的立場表達：

“Our country’s doing unbelievably well economically,” he toldreporters Friday. Yet even as Mr. Trumpcelebrated the robust hiring numbers, he called again for the Federal Reserveto cut interest rates – a step that would ordinarily suggest worries about theeconomy’s direction. Growth “would belike a rocket ship” if the Fed acted, he declared. (The New York Times, July 6)

“我們國家的經濟狀況令人難以置信，”他周五告訴記者。然而，即使川普先生慶祝強勁的招聘數據，他再次呼籲美聯儲降息-這通常表明對經濟方向的擔憂。他宣稱，如果美聯儲采取行動，增長“將像火箭一樣”。（紐約時報，7月6日）

On the basis of the above, one mightconclude that Trump thinks rates should always be low. But there was at least one instance when hethought rates were being held too low:

在上述基礎上，人們可能會得出結論，川普認為利率應始終較低。但至少有一個例子，他認為利率過低：

In late 2015 then-candidate Donald Trumpaccused Janet Yellen, chair of the Federal Reserve, of being part of apolitical conspiracy. Yellen, he insisted, was keeping interest ratesunjustifiably low in an attempt to help Hillary Clinton win thepresidency. (The New York Times, June20)

在2015年底，當時的候選人唐納德川普指責美聯儲主席珍妮特耶倫成為政治陰謀的一部分。他堅持認為，耶倫為了幫助希拉裡克林頓贏得總統職位而保持低利率不合理。（紐約時報，6月20日）

Regardless, it’s clear that, at this time,Trump thinks low rates are good and there’s no reason to worry about potentialnegative ramifications. But that doesn’tmean they don’t exist.

無論如何，很明顯，在這個時候，川普認為低利率是好的，並且沒有理由擔心潛在的負面影響。但這並不意味著它們不存在。

Is There a Downside to Low Interest Rates?

低利率有下行空間嗎？

The truth is, there are ways in which lowrates are undesirable and potentially harmful. They include these:

事實是，有些方法可能會導致低利率並且可能有害。它們包括：

Low rates stimulate the economy, asdescribed above, and most economists and businesspeople believe there’s such athing as the economy becoming too hot. The principal worry is excessive inflation. While some inflation is a good thing, toomuch isn’t. It’s generally accepted thattoo much of the positives described on page three can lead to excessive demandfor goods and services; too-tight labor conditions, leading to excessive wageinflation; too much market power in the hands of sellers of goods; and thusrising prices.

如上所述，低利率刺激了經濟，而且大多數經濟學家和商人都認為經濟變得太熱了。主要擔心的是過度通脹。雖然一些通貨膨脹是好事，但太多不是。人們普遍認為，第三頁所描述的過多的積極因素會導致對商品和服務的過度需求;過於緊張的勞動條件，導致工資過度膨脹;商品賣家手中的市場力量過大;從而價格上漲。

Too much inflation imposes a hardship onpeople living on fixed incomes, since their costs increase rapidly while theirincomes don’t. Also, low-incomehouseholds typically don’t have the means to hedge against inflation that high-incomeones do, such as through investments in equities and real assets.

太多的通貨膨脹給生活在固定收入的人帶來了困難，因為他們的成本迅速增加，而他們的收入卻沒有。此外，低收入家庭通常沒有辦法對衝高收入家庭所做的通貨膨脹，例如通過投資股票和實物資產。

When low rates penalize savers by reducingthe returns available on safe instruments like cash, money market funds,savings accounts, Treasury securities and high grade bonds, savers’ alternativeto accepting lower incomes is to assume increased risk in pursuit of the higherreturns they used to earn safely.

當低利率通過降低現金，貨幣市場基金，儲蓄账戶，國債和高級債券等安全工具的可用回報來懲罰儲蓄者時，儲蓄者接受低收入的替代方案是承擔更高的風險以追求他們使用的更高回報安全地賺錢。

Thus low rates can lead to investment inundeserving companies and shaky securities, encourage the use of excessiveleverage, and create asset bubbles that eventually can burst.

因此，低利率可能導致對不值得公司和不穩定證券的投資，鼓勵使用過度杠杆，並產生最終可能爆發的資產泡沫。

Ultimately, investors’ tendency to reachfor yield and assume excessive risk can introduce risk to overall financialstability.

Finally, but very importantly, wheninterest rates are low, central banks don’t have at their disposal as much oftheir best tool for stimulating economies: the ability to cut rates.

最終，投資者達到收益率並承擔過高風險的傾向可能會給整體金融穩定帶來風險。

最後，但非常重要的是，當利率較低時，央行並沒有盡可能多地利用它們刺激經濟的最佳工具：降低利率的能力。

The following is from a report from RDQEconomics dated June 27:

以下內容來自6月27日RDQ Economics的報告：

What seems lost in the policy assessment isa careful discussion of the risks of overly accommodative monetary policy. Powell did say this week, “we are alsomindful that monetary policy should not overreact to any individual data pointor short-term swing in sentiment. Doingso would risk adding even more uncertainty to the outlook.” However, our view is that Powell’sobservation of the downside of a dovish overreaction is an inadequate assessmentof the risk from unnecessarily adding monetary accommodation at this time.

在政策評估中似乎失去的是仔細討論過度寬鬆的貨幣政策的風險。鮑威爾本周表示，“我們也注意到貨幣政策不應對任何個別數據點或情緒短期波動反應過度。這樣做可能會給前景帶來更多的不確定性。“但是，我們認為，鮑威爾對溫和過度反應的負面影響的觀察是對此時不必要地增加貨幣寬鬆的風險評估不足。

. . . underlying inflation is already closeto target and the Fed’s past attempts (in the late 1960s/early 1970s) to tradeoff a little more inflation for sustained lower rates of unemployment turnedout very badly. Alternatively, higherlabor costs from an overheated jobs market might squeeze company profit marginsand lead to a pullback in investment and hiring.

。。。潛在通脹已經接近目標，美聯儲過去的嘗試（在20世紀60年代末/ 70年代初期）為了持續降低失業率而通過更多通貨膨脹進行權衡結果非常糟糕。另外，過熱就業市場的勞動力成本上升可能會擠壓公司的利潤率並導致投資和招聘的回落。

A Daunting Task

艱巨的任務

The juxtaposition of the above lists ofpositives and negatives shows that low interest rates – just like most otheraspects of economics – have both pros and cons. A lot depends on how they’re viewed. This is illustrated by one of the greatest cartoons from my collection:

上述正面和負面列表的並列表明，低利率-就像經濟學的大多數其他方面一樣-既有利也有利。很大程度上取決於他們的觀看方式。這是我收藏的最偉大的漫畫之一：

That cartoon is 38 years old. Here’s how The Times put it as recently as acouple of weeks ago:

這幅漫畫是38歲。以下是“泰晤士報”最近幾周前發布的消息：

The gains this week began after FederalReserve chair, Jerome Powell, suggested the nation’s central bank was worriedabout the economy. Just days earlier,strong data on the job market had the opposite effect on stocks.

美聯儲主席傑羅姆·鮑威爾（Jerome Powell）表示，該國央行擔心經濟問題，本周開始上漲。就在幾天前，就業市場的強勁數據對股市產生了相反的影響。

This counterintuitive reaction to the newsis a phenomenon that’s explained by expectations for interest rates. The weakeningoutlook for the economy means, in all likelihood, borrowing costs are comingdown — and in the right circumstances, this can be good for stocks. (The New York Times, July 12)

這種對新聞的反直覺反應是一種由對利率的預期所解釋的現象。經濟前景疲軟意味著借貸成本極有可能下降-在適當的情況下，這對股市有利。（紐約時報，7月12日）

Many people think of an economy as adependable machine that operates according to diagrams and rules, and ofcentral bank actions as levers that can be pulled to adjust the functioning ofthat machine. But, instead, I believe alot of uncertainty and variability exist regarding the functioning of economiesand central banks. This means the taskof managing an economy is difficult, and its goals shouldn’t be thought of asdependably achievable.

許多人認為經濟是一種可靠的機器，它按照圖表和規則運作，而中央銀行的行動則可以作為杠杆來調整機器的功能。但相反，我認為在經濟和中央銀行的運作方面存在很多不確定性和可變性。這意味著管理經濟的任務很困難，其目標不應被視為可靠地實現。

I think a recent article from The Timesprovides a great picture of how challenging the job is, and how many ways thereare to be wrong. Here’s most of it:

我認為“泰晤士報”最近的一篇文章提供了一份關於這項工作具有挑戰性以及有多少種錯誤方式的圖片。以下是其中的大部分內容：

Heading into their policy decision and newsconference Wednesday [June 19], there were a lot of ways Federal Reserveofficials could have messed things up.

周三[6月19日]進入他們的政策決定和新聞發布會，美聯儲官員可能會有很多方式搞砸了事情。

One possibility was a repeat of the meetingin December, when markets judged Chairman Jerome Powell and the Fed to beoblivious about negative forces building in the markets and in the globaleconomy, and sold off precipitously over the next days.

一種可能性是12月會議的重演，當時市場判斷主席傑羅姆鮑威爾和美聯儲對市場和全球經濟中的負面力量一無所知，並在接下來的日子裡急劇拋售。

But the opposite risk was present as well —that out of fear of repeating the December episode, Mr. Powell would exhibittoo much of a hair-trigger reaction to recent signs of a slowdown in inflationpressures and industrial activity. Ifthose turn out to be false alarms, a rate cut now would be counterproductive bysignaling pessimism and making the Fed look jittery and perhaps even overlyinfluenced by President Trump’s threats to try to demote Mr. Powell overinterest rate policy. . . .

但也存在相反的風險-由於擔心重複12月份的事件，鮑威爾先生將對近期通脹壓力和工業活動放緩的跡象表現出過多的反應。如果那些結果是誤報，那麽降息現在會產生反作用，表明悲觀情緒並讓美聯儲看起來緊張，甚至可能過度影響川普總統威脅試圖降低鮑威爾先生的利率政策。。。。

In effect, Fed officials are indicatingthey think it’s pretty likely they will need to cut rates, but are waiting formore evidence.

實際上，美聯儲官員表示他們認為他們很可能需要降息，但正在等待更多證據。

The relatively muted reaction of financialmarkets suggests that Wall Street viewed the move [i.e., no change in rates onJune 19 but foreshadowing likely cuts later in the year] as appropriatelybalanced. The stock market was up, butonly a little, which helps reduce the sense the Fed is just acting to prop upstocks, while bond yields fell further as markets became more confident thatrate cuts were on the way.

金融市場相對平靜的反應表明，華爾街認為這一舉措[即6月19日的匯率沒有變化，但預示今年晚些時候可能的削減]是適當平衡的。股市上漲，但只有一點點，這有助於降低美聯儲正在采取行動支撐股票的意識，而債券收益率進一步下跌，因為市場對降息正在變得更加自信。

So in terms of the narrow goal of gettingthrough Wednesday without either markets falling apart or the Fed’s credibilitybeing shredded, it was a good day for Mr. Powell.

因此，就周三沒有任何市場崩潰或美聯儲可信度被破壞的狹隘目標而言，這對鮑威爾先生來說是個好日子。

But the flip side of that is that somelingering questions have been put off to another day.

但另一方面，一些揮之不去的問題已被推遲到另一天。

Deciding to wait for more evidence is adecision, too. Waiting might buy the Fedmore time to make sure it’s getting the decision right, but at the cost oflosing the opportunity to show it is aggressive and willing to get ahead of apotentially serious problem

決定等待更多證據也是一個決定。等待可能會讓美聯儲有更多的時間來確保它能夠做出正確的決定，但代價是失去機會表明它是積極的並且願意領先於潛在的嚴重問題。

Put differently, if you wait until there iscompletely compelling evidence of an economic shift before doing somethingabout it, you’re probably too late.

換句話說，如果你等到經濟轉變的完全令人信服的證據之前做一些事情，你可能為時已晚。

On the other hand, if the Fed later judgesthat the recent bad news really was just a temporary blip and that rate cutswere actually not needed, they will face the reality of rate cuts even morebaked into the prices of Treasury bonds. It would be a doozy of an adjustment to bring them into alignment. If the sharp drop in rates that has takenplace since November were to reverse quickly, it could cause huge damage tointerest-sensitive sectors like housing and automobiles. (“The Fed Threads the Needle, for Now,” June21 – emphasis added)

另一方面，如果美聯儲後來判斷最近的壞消息實際上只是暫時的曇花一現並且實際上並不需要降息，他們將面臨降息的現實，甚至更多的是國債價格。將它們調整起來將是一種調整。如果11月以來出現的利率大幅下降將迅速逆轉，則可能對住房和汽車等對利率敏感的行業造成巨大損害。（“美聯儲現在主動針對這一點，”6月21日-重點補充）

In other words, there’s the risk of beingunresponsive or over-responsive, along with the risk of doing too much or toolittle, and of doing it too soon or too late.

換句話說，存在無響應或過度響應的風險，以及做太多或太少的風險，以及做得太快或太晚的風險。

The Fed usually acts in response to theoverall outlook for the economy: hundreds of millions of transactions enteredinto by Americans each day. But amongthe “developments” Powell said the Fed is monitoring today are some veryspecific, largely political actions. Inparticular, the Fed has to anticipate and cope with the possibility of a tradewar, probably the greatest source of economic uncertainty today. It has to make interest rate and quantitativeeasing decisions based on its judgment as to what Trump will do (and itsimpact). Not to mention the lingeringrisk that Powell’s job hangs in the balance if the answer isn’t low rates. Certainly little of this can be thought of asscientific or reliable.

美聯儲通常采取行動以應對整體經濟前景：美國人每天都有數億筆交易。但在“發展”中，鮑威爾表示，美聯儲今天監測的是一些非常具體的，主要是政治行動。特別是，美聯儲必須預測和應對貿易戰的可能性，這可能是當今經濟不確定性的最大來源。它必須根據其對川普將做什麽（及其影響）的判斷來做出利率和量化寬鬆決策。更不用說如果答案不是低利率，那麽鮑威爾的工作就會在餘額中徘徊。當然，這一點很少被認為是科學的或可靠的。

Further, the Fed has to practicepsychology:

此外，美聯儲必須實踐心理學：

. . . Mr. Powell was asked at the newsconference about academic research suggesting that when interest rates are nearzero, a central bank actually should be more aggressive, rather than less,about cutting rates in the event of a slump — to maintain credibility that itwill not let deflation take hold.

。。。鮑威爾先生在新聞發布會上被問及學術研究表明，當利率接近於零時，央行實際上應該更加積極而不是更少，以便在經濟衰退的情況下降低利率-以保持其可信度。不要讓通貨緊縮。

In “This Time It’s Different,” I expressedmy view that one of the reasons interest rate adjustments work is that it’scommonly accepted that they will work. When a rate cut is announced, people take it on faith that it will causethe economy to strengthen and markets to rise. Thus they conclude it’s appropriate to spend more and invest more, andtheir resulting behavior produces the desired response in the economy andmarkets. Do the lower rates cause therise, or is it belief in the efficacy of rate cuts? Both, I’d say. But certainly the latter’s contribution isn’tinsignificant. As I asked in “ThisTime,” would a rate cut have the same impact if it weren’t accompanied by anannouncement? Clearly, prevailingopinion regarding Fed management matters a great deal in the efficacy of itsactions.

在“這次與眾不同”中，我表達了我的觀點，即利率調整工作的原因之一是人們普遍認為它們會起作用。在宣布降息時，人們會相信它將導致經濟增強和市場上漲。因此，他們得出結論，花更多錢和投入更多是合適的，並且由此產生的行為會在經濟和市場中產生預期的反應。較低的利率會導致上漲，還是相信降息的效果？兩個，我會說。但肯定後者的貢獻並非微不足道。正如我在“這個時候”所說的那樣，如果沒有公告，降息會產生同樣的影響嗎？顯然，關於美聯儲管理的普遍看法對其行動的效力至關重要。

Not only does the Fed have to figure outwhat actions it should take to keep the economic machine humming, but alsowhether people will react positively and trust in them to work. In other words, psychology, not justeconomics.

美聯儲不僅要弄清楚應該采取什麽行動來保持經濟機器的嗡嗡聲，還要考慮人們是否會積極反應並相信他們能夠工作。換句話說，心理學，而不僅僅是經濟學。

[Powell] acknowledged the idea behind that[academic] work, saying that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,”but declined to connect it to what exactly the Fed might do in the currentcircumstance. “I don’t know what that meansin terms of the size of a particular rate cut going forward,” he said.

[鮑威爾]承認這項[學術]工作背後的想法，稱“一盎司預防值得一磅治療”，但拒絕將其與美聯儲在當前情況下可能采取的行動聯繫起來。他說：“我不知道這對於特定降息的規模意味著什麽。”

So did the Fed get it right Wednesday withthe balanced, nuanced approach Mr. Powell chose? The answer is: Ask in a fewmonths.

那麽美聯儲是否在周三以鮑威爾先生選擇的平衡，細致入微的方式做到了這一點？答案是：幾個月後問。

So what’s the bottom line? On one hand, our economy is stillexpanding. Monetary stimulus via ratecuts (just like fiscal stimulus via deficit spending) is in order when the economyis weak and failing to create jobs. Butstimulus may be somewhere between unneeded and counter- productive at timeslike today, when the economy is growing acceptably, the unemployment rate is ata 50-year low, wages are rising, and the recovery has just become the longestin history. As I said when the Trump taxcut was enacted in December 2017, doctors don’t prescribe adrenaline forhealthy patients. The economy today ishealthy. But the Fed has to worry aboutwhether it will remain so, and in particular whether there will be a full-fledgedtrade war with China.

那麽底線是什麽？一方面，我們的經濟仍在擴張。當經濟疲軟且未能創造就業機會時，通過降息實施貨幣刺激措施（就像通過赤字支出實施的財政刺激措施）是有序的。但刺激可能介於不需要和適得其反之間，有時像今天這樣，經濟增長可以接受，失業率處於50年來的最低點，工資正在上升，而復甦已成為歷史上最長的。正如我在2017年12月頒布的川普減稅政策時所說，醫生並沒有為健康的病人開出腎上腺素。今天的經濟是健康的。但美聯儲不得不擔心它是否會如此，特別是是否會與中國發生全面的貿易戰。

Thus, on the other hand, people areconcerned about the potential for economic weakness. Recent market reaction suggests investors arefollowing their usual elementary take: weak economyrate cutseconomic stimulusstronger GDPhigher corporate profitshigher stock prices. WhenPowell indicated on July 10 that a rate cut could be more imminent than mosthad thought, the market sat up and saluted, taking the S&P 500 above 3,000for the first time. It’s always worth considering whether investorsare reacting too positively to the prospect of rate cuts and paying too littleheed to the economic weakness on which they’re predicated (and the potentialunintended consequences they might bring on).

因此，另一方面，人們擔心經濟疲軟的可能性。最近的市場反應表明，投資者正在遵循他們通常的基本面：經濟疲軟降息經濟刺激GDP增長企業利潤增加股價上漲。當鮑威爾在7月10日表示降息可能比大多數人想象的更為迫在眉睫時，市場坐下來敬禮，首次將標準普爾500指數高於3,000點。總是值得考慮的是投資者是否對降息的前景做出過於積極的反應，並且對於他們所預測的經濟疲軟（以及他們可能帶來的潛在意外後果）過於謹慎。

Thus, on the “third hand,” I want to returnto the paragraph I included above from “This Time It’s Different”:

因此，在“第三隻手”上，我想回到上面的“我不同的時間”這一段：

Finally, when I hear people talk about thepossibility that the Fed will prevent a recession, I wonder whether it’s evendesirable for it to have that goal. Perthe above, are recessions really avoidable or merely postponable? And if the latter, is it better for them tooccur naturally or be postponed unnaturally? Might efforts to postpone them create undue faith in the power and intentionsof the Fed, and thus a return of moral hazard? And if the Fed wards off a series of little recessions, mightn’t thatjust mean that, when the ability to keep doing so reaches its limit, the onethat finally arrives will be a doozy?

Should we be happy to see the Fed trying toprolong the economic expansion and the bull market when they’re already thelongest in history? Should it try toproduce perpetual prosperity and permanently ward off a correction? Are there risks in its trying to do so? It all depends on which hand is doing theweighing.

我們是否應該高興地看到美聯儲試圖延長經濟擴張和牛市，因為它們已經是歷史上最長的？它是否應該試圖產生永久的繁榮並永久地避免糾正？嘗試這樣做有風險嗎？這完全取決於哪隻手正在進行稱重。

- The End-

（完）

文章來源：微信公眾號“金融與風險”2019年8月1日（本文僅代表作者觀點）

本篇編輯：付守鑫